Androids and Ethics

I've been reading Kinsella recently on ethics. He seems to assert that property rights are what determine self-ownership rather than the other way around. He says that your body is property of your Self because you have direct control over it and had first control over it, making it homesteaded by you. I'm a bit confused on the origin of self-ownership in relation to property rights. In many other libertarian writings, including Hoppe, authors assert that self-ownership is true because to deny it is a performative contradiction and from this idea flows the basic moral system of property rights.

Kinsella, apparently, basis his ideas on Hoppe's argumentation ethics as do I (What you could call ideas) but I can't understand why they diverge on this particular subject.

 So who is correct, or more correct? Where do libertarian ethics begin?

You could make the utilitarian argument of Mises but right now I'm more concerned with the deontological arguments. Being more of an ethics-buff than an economics-buff, the guiding principles on which libertarianism is based interest me deeply and I accept the NAP, the Self-ownership principle, and extended property rights (as in more than just personal possession when it is in use) but I'm not entirely sure what leads to what and how.

My first argument against Kinsella stems from my sci-fi obsession, in the form of a completely outrageous but nonetheless interesting scenario.

So if we imagine a programmer builds a conscious android whose body can be controlled by the programmer at a computer. At some times, the android's Self has complete control over his actions and therefore qualifies for the self-ownership principle. But at other times, the programmer may take control of the android's body and he is powerless to stop it and the programmer has both direct and first use.

The programmer also has creative rights, which are invalid by Kinsellan ethics.

The programmer has indisputable first and direct use as he activated the android and used his cognitive and motor functions first (undoubtedly in tests) and can seize control of him at any time. Assuming he wants to hold onto these rights, he has control of the android's body and possibly even his mind without the android's consent.

Clearly this is a form of slavery but my understanding of Kinsella's argument leads me to believe that this scenario would be possible under his system. A consciousness is trapped, immovably, inside another's property which violates both basic freedom of movement and self-determination. This cannot be allowed to happen under any moral system.

I know this is an odd scenario but it touches on the very real issue of whether or not people who are not in complete control of their actions technically own themselves and the results of their actions. I know that if the android commits a crime while under the control of his programmer he is not responsible but this is not the same as his body being the property of his programmer just as a person is not responsible for murder if someone stole their gun and shot someone else.

So I come to a point of deduction really. I want to believe the android owns his body but I don't know exactly why. The only reasons I can think of for this is a subjective freedom ethic, which would be altogether too vague or an ethic which begins with the self-ownership principle. The use of the body is necessary to carry out the will of the mind; therefore a mind has ownership of its respective body. 

Property would then be an extension of freedom of mind and that opens up the path for the moralization of intellectual property, which has always rubbed me the wrong way even before I started reading Kinsella. Not to mention it sounds a lot like Rand and the last thing I want to do in my moral thinking is declare that government must exist because "Man is Man".

So again, I'm still a little lost on this one but Hoppe seems to have the best idea of the origin of libertarian ethics; one that is not based on vague or romanticized ideas but logic and that doesn't allow for the possibility of someone controlling someone else's body non-consensually. I've read that Kinsella accepts Hoppe's argumentation ethics but I don't understand how, if he believes that rights stem for self-ownership, he still claims that property rights precede self-ownership and that the homestead principle is therefore more basic than the self-ownership principle.